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A RESPONSE TO THE PROPOSED ESTABLISHMENT
OF AN ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCY TO CREATE AND
ENFORCE RULES REGULATING POLICE CONDUCT

NEVIN VAN DE STREEK*

Dear Professor Lockney:
I thought you would not mind a few gratuitous reflections on
your essay concerning the fourth amendment and the exclusionary
rule, which appeared in the most recent issue of the North Dakota
Law Review. '
I understand your central thesis to be that it might be possible
to devise an administrative mechanism that would accomplish very
much the same goals sought to be accomplished through the
application of the exclusionary rule, thus permitting the
exclusionary rule to be dismantled. 2 True enough, you speak of the
3
exclusionary rule as being modified rather than being abolished.
But if the administrative agency that you envision is able to
accomplish the three tasks you assigned to it (to formulate, to teach,
and to enforce administrative rules regulating the conduct of law
4
enforcement officials in making arrests, Searches, and seizures),
then under your own reasoning the rule would be abolished as a
practical matter, unless you intend to retain it under some
*A.B. Stanford University, 1967; J.D. University of Michigan, 1970 (cum laude); partner in
Eaton, Van de Streek & Ward, Minot, North Dakota.
1. See Lockney, An Open Letter to the North Dakota Attorney General Concerning Search and Seizure Law
and the Exclusionary Rule, 62 N.D.L. REv. 17 (1986).
2. See id. at 27-33.
3. See id. at 27-28.
4. See id. at 28.
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circumstances not mentioned in your essay, such as when the
wrongful police conduct is flagrant and deliberate.
To the extent that the exclusionary rule is intended to deter
future official disregard of the values embodied in the fourth
amendment, I concur that the proposed administrative agency may
function as well as, or even much better than, the exclusionary
rule. My concurrence follows from the view that the agency could
discipline law enforcement officials directly, by the imposition of a
fine or a suspension without pay, and it could do so in situations in
which the exclusionary rule is never invoked because there is no
criminal prosecution.
The proposed administrative agency is a very good idea for
those reasons alone, without regard to whatever effect its existence
might have on the exclusionary rule. But you claim greater merit
for the agency than that which I have just acknowledged. You state
that the agency rules governing arrests, searches, and seizures
would be "clearer and more detailed" and easier to administer
than the rules that courts have evolved in deciding cases arising
under the fourth amendment.' This statement so startled and
bemused me that I could not resist writing this letter. Why is there
any reason whatsoever in human experience to believe that any
administrative agency can adopt regulations that are plainly
expressed and easily understood? If you can cite but one example of
such an agency, and the regulations which it produced, can it also
fairly be claimed that the subject matter of those regulations was as
inherently complex and confusing as the established doctrines
relating to fourth amendment jurisprudence? Is there somewhere
an untapped pool of legal talent ready to join this administrative
agency - a talent pool that contains individuals who are able to
simplify and rationalize doctrines that have confused and
confounded extremely able lawyers, judges, legal commentators,
and law school professors such as yourself?
If your rejoinder is that the rules established by the
administrative agency do not have to address all the subtleties and
nuances that are implicated in a typical fourth amendment court
decision, then what do the rules address? Can you give an example
or a skeleton outline of the rules?
In your essay you pose a very interesting hypothetical case,
gleaned from the facts of three different North Dakota Supreme
Court cases. 6 Under the hypothetical the following issues arise: (1)
5. See id. at 30-31.
6. Seeid. at 21-22.
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whether probable cause existed for the issuance of a search warrant;
(2) whether the officers executing the warrant properly announced
their presence and purpose; and (3) whether the officers improperly
exceeded the scope of the search authorized by the warrant. 7 You
use the hypothetical quite adeptly to illustrate the convoluted
nature of the court-fashioned rules that seek to resolve those issues,
and correspondingly, how difficult it is to teach, to learn, and to
enforce the rules. But how would the administrative rules you
contemplate apply to your hypothetical, that is, how would they
guide the behavior of the officers? You are silent on that point.
Indeed, it is difficult to see how the "clear" rules to be
established by the proposed administrative agency would be of
much practical assistance to the law enforcement officers involved
in your hypothetical case. Presumably the administrative agency
would agree that probable cause is required to conduct a search
even if the agency would (and constitutionally could) dispense with
the warrant requirement. But when is probable cause established?
This is typically the most difficult question presented in any fourth
amendment case. It is difficult not because the various verbal
formulas that are used to explain what constitutes probable cause
are intrinsically unclear when stated in the abstract. Rather these
various expressions of the probable cause test become unclear when
they must be applied to concrete factual situations. But surely this
phenomenon is not confined to fourth amendment jurisprudence.
The rule of law that one must drive an automobile with due care in
view of the surrounding circumstances is easy to state and to
understand in the abstract, but applying it to a given set of factual
circumstances can cause a jury much agony and indecision. I really
can not perceive, and you do not tell us, how the administrative
agency's rules will simplify probable cause determinations, and
that is at least half the ballgame.
Most of the other issues raised in the hypothetical relate to
limitations on the proper scope of a search, assuming that the
search is lawful in the first instance. 8 The court rules that address
the "knock or no knock" issues posed in your hypothetical are not
necessarily unclear, although one could argue that they are
unsound as a matter of public policy. I think your suggestion that,
in the ordinary case, law officers might have difficulty in
determining the actual "entrance" to a dwelling is a little
far-fetched. 9 If there is a recurring problem in that regard, how will
it be resolved by the administrative rules?
7. See id. at 23-26.
8. See id. at 24.
9. See id.
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The court rules relating to the "plain view" issues embedded
in the hypothetical are admittedly much more confusing. With
respect to these issues the administrative agency has a very fair
chance of writing simpler and clearer rules than those derived from
court opinions on the subject. But I feel it is revealing to examine
why the plain view cases are so muddled, because the resulting
analysis discloses an important problem that you recognize, but
which you tend to gloss over.
The confusion that abounds in the particular context of the
plain view doctrine (and in the general context of fourth
amendment law) results not solely because the courts are bending
over backwards to ensnare criminal defendants, but also because
the courts are swaying the other way to protect privacy rights. If the
courts had no concern about privacy rights they could eliminate
most issues arising under the plain view doctrine by simply holding
that the search and seizure of any object in the course of executing a
search warrant is lawful provided the officer does not pry into an
area in which it would be objectively unreasonable for him to
expect to find those items that are the object of the search. Thus an
officer armed with a warrant to search for and to seize a stolen
twenty-one inch television set could not look into a shoe box. To the
extent that courts have been hesitant to adopt the rule just
suggested, they are motivated by privacy concerns rather than by
concerns that the exclusionary rule is improperly protecting
criminals. In an effort to protect the privacy of the citizenry in
general, courts have developed limitations on the plain view
doctrine; for example, the discovery of evidence not contemplated
within the warrant must be inadvertent. 10 Unfortunately, as you
note, this fine tuning of the doctrine makes the entire concept
complicated and confusing.
All of this indicates that, whether an administrative agency or
the courts make the rules, the rules will be unclear, complex, and
contradictory as long as a sincere effort is made to balance privacy
interests against the desire to capture and punish criminals. The
only way I see out of this dilemma is if the administrative agency
decided that it would not attempt to hold the balance true, as the
courts now endeavor to do, but instead decided to tip the scales
either in favor of law enforcement goals or in favor of the
preservation of privacy interests. If it did the first, then it would be
difficult to argue that the federal courts should limit or abolish the
10. See, e.g., Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 469 (1971) (the plain view doctrine is
limited by the principle that the discovery of evidence must be inadvertent).
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exclusionary rule in North Dakota, for surely you intend that the
rules pay deference to the fourth amendment. If the agency chose
the second course of action, favoring privacy interests over law
enforcement goals, it would probably be killed by the legislature
even before it could be added to the federal list of endangered
species.
I do not contend that greater simplicity and clarity in fourth
amendment law is undesirable and unattainable. To the contrary, I
maintain that three recent developments mark a trend toward the
simplification of fourth amendment jurisprudence. This trend is
not attributable, however, to any administrative action. Rather,
the praise or blame for the trend must be directed to the courts
themselves. You mention some or all of these developments in your
essay, yet you fail to give them proper emphasis; for if the trend of
which they are a part is developed sufficiently, the exclusionary rule
will become nearly obsolete. These developments are: (1) the
dilution of probable cause standards; (2) the forgiveness of "good
faith" violations of the fourth amendment; and (3) the creation of
"bright line" parameters defining the scope of an authorized
search.
According to Illinois v. Gates,1 1 a search warrant may be issued
if there is a substantialchance that the search will produce evidence of
criminal wrongdoing.1 2 I emphasize the words "substantial
chance" because those are the words of the Court at one point in
the opinion. 3 I think it is but a short step from the "substantial
chance" standard to a standard of probable cause which states, in
effect, that as long as the law enforcement officers are not searching
at random or on a whim the fourth amendment is satisfied. The
reasoning would be that if a search is conducted on some random
selection basis, or upon a hunch, then there is not a substantial
chance that evidence of criminal activity will be discovered.
Conversely, if the officer can demonstrate to the magistrate's
satisfaction that the selection of a particular property for a search is
based on something other than random selection or whim, then it
follows that the substantial chance test is met. In other words, Gates
may instruct us that it is old fashioned to think of separate concepts
of "reasonable suspicion" and "probable cause," and that the
latter is being merged into the former.
Not only has the United States Supreme Court seriously
11. 462 U.S. 213 (1983).
12. Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 243 n. 13 (1984) (emphasis added).
13. Id. In the words of the Court: "[P]robable cause requires only a probability or substantial
chance of criminal activity, not an actual showing of such activity." Id.
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diluted the probable cause test, but the Court has gone on to hold
that even if the magistrate makes an error in judgment under the
Gates standard of probable cause, the evidence seized pursuant to
the magistrate's authorization may be used in criminal proceedings
provided the officer executing the warrant had an objective, good
faith belief that the magistrate acted properly in issuing the
warrant. 14 The Court has not yet decided whether the "good faith
exception" to the exclusionary rule should be extended to
warrantless searches, but Mr. Justice White's concurring opinion
in Gates indicates that he is willing to take that step. 5 He seems to
believe that the fruits of a warrantless search should not necessarily
be excluded merely because the officer mistakenly believed that
there was probable cause to make the warrantless search, but rather
he would trigger the exclusionary rule only if the officer was
unreasonably mistaken in believing that probable cause to conduct a
warrantless search existed. 16
Finally, New York v. Belton 7 and United States v. RosS' 8 both
seem to foreshadow an ultimate holding by the Supreme Court that
14. See United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 926(1984).
15. See Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 246 (White,J., concurring).
16. See id. at 259, n. 14. Justice White, in Gates, stated as follows:
But the question of exclusion must be viewed through a different lens when a Fourth
Amendment violation occurs because the police have reasonably erred in assessing the
facts, mistakenly conducted a search under a presumably valid statute, or relied in
good faith upon a warrant not supported by probable cause.
Id.
17. 453 U.S. 454 (1981). The defendant in Belton had been a passenger in an automobile stopped
by police for speeding. United States v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454, 455 (1981). The defendant, and other
passengers, were removed from the automobile and placed under arrest for possession-of marijuana.
Id. at 456. Thereafter the arresting officer searched the passenger compartment of the automobile.
Id. In the course of the search, the officer discovered cocaine in the zipped pocket of the defendant's
jacket, which was laying in the back seat of the car. Id. The defendant moved to suppress the seized
cocaine, arguing that it was obtained in violation of the fourth and fourteenth amendments. Id. The
trial court denied the defendant's motion. Id. On appeal, the United States Supreme Court upheld
the validity of the search concluding that the search of the automobile was a legitimate search
incident to arrest. Id. at 460. Since the search of the automobile was legitimate, the Court concluded
that "[i]t follows . . . that the police may also examine the contents of any containers found within
the passenger compartment."
18. 456 U.S. 798 (1982). The defendant in Ross had been arrested after police stopped his
automobile and discovered a bullet and gun in the car's interior. United States v. Ross, 456 U.S.
798, 801 (1982). The police also suspected that the defendant was selling drugs. See id. at 800. After
placing the defendant under arrest, the police opened the car's trunk. Id. at 801. Inside they
observed a brown paper bag. Id. The police opened the bag and "discovered a number of glassine
bags containing a white powder." Id. The powder proved to be heroin. Id. Prior to his trial, Ross
moved to suppress the heroin found in the paper bag. Id. The trial court denied his motion and Ross
was convicted. Id. On appeal, the United States Supreme Court upheld the warrantless search and
seizure of the container found in the trunk of Ross' automobile. See id. at 825. In reaching this
conclusion, the Court stated as follows:
The scope of a warrantless search of an automobile thus is not defined by the
nature of the container in which the contraband is secreted. Rather, it is defined by the
object of the search and the places in which there is probable cause to believe that it
may be found.
Id. at 824.
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the scope of a search, whether based upon a warrant or not, is
limited only by the principle that law enforcement officers may not
look into a thing or a place that obviously could not contain the
object of the search. Such a holding would eliminate the
"inadvertence" component of the plain view doctrine because
police could seize all evidence in plain view provided the evidence
was "discovered" while searching containers that could have
contained the object of the search.
The foregoing developments support my assertion that it is
possible to make simpler rules in the fourth amendment context,
but only at the price of paying much greater homage to law
enforcement concerns, or to privacy concerns, but not to both.
Because the Supreme Court has apparently decided to make
privacy subservient to law enforcement, the occasions for invoking
the exclusionary rule may become fewer and fewer. Consequently,
it is my conclusion that if there is a case to be made in favor of the
administrative agency you propose, it must rest, to a very large
extent, on grounds other than dissatisfaction with the operation and
effect of the exclusionary rule.

